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A SIXTH-CENTURY MANUAL OF INDIAN LOGIC*

(A Translation of the NYĀYAPRAVEŚA)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Text of The NYĀYAPRAVEŚA

The history of Indian logic may be divided into three periods, old Nyāya, Buddhist logic, and new Nyāya. The sixth century A.D., the efflorescence of the second period, was characterized by the establishment of the doctrine of Dignāga (circa A.D. 480–540).[1] Śaṅkarasvāmin, who is said to have been a disciple of Dignāga,[2] composed the *Nyāyapraveśa* as an introduction to Dignāga's doctrine.[3] This work seems to have been popular even among the Jains, for Haribhadra, a Jain, wrote a commentary on it in the eleventh century or slightly earlier.[4]

Hsüan Tsang (A.D. 602–664) made a Chinese translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*,[5] and his disciple K'uei Chi[6] and others commented on it. Hsüan Tsang's translation has been one of the most important textbooks for the science of Buddhist logic in China as well as in Japan. We have two Tibetan translations, one from the Sanskrit,[7] and the other from Hsüan Tsang's Chinese translation.[8]

The Sanskrit text was published by B. Dhruva for the first time in 1930 (G.O.S. ed. No. 38).[9] N. D. Mironov had another edition printed in *T'oung Pao* the next year.[10] Having compared these Sanskrit texts with the Chinese translation, H. Ui concluded that the Chinese translation represents the form closest to the original, and that there should be some later interpolations in those Sanskrit editions which have been published so far. Thus realizing the value of the Chinese translation, he published another edition in 1944.[11]

I will use Dhruva's edition (D) as the basic text of the following translation, and point out differences between the Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation in the notes.

2. The Contents of The Nyāyapraveśa

The *Nyāyapraveśa* deals with the following topics:

Means of proof (*sādhana*): The statements comprising a correct syllogism, capable of convincing others.

Fallacious means of proof (*sādhanābhāsa*): The defective statements incapable of convincing others;

Means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*).

Fallacious means of refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

Fallacious perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) and fallacious inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

The first two topics are the main concern of our treatise.

3. *Property (Dharma) and Property-possessor (Dharmin)*

The relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* plays a fundamental role in the Indian system of inference. Indian logicians conducted their inference on the basis of the *dharma-dharmin* relation. Here the word '*dharma*' means a property while '*dharmin*' designates a property-possessor. The concepts of property and property-possessor are complementary to each other. The *dharma-dharmin* relation may be formulated as follows:

> When x occurs in y, x is the property (*dharma*) and y is the property-possessor (*dharmin*).

The property-possessor may be regarded as the locus or the substratum in or upon which the property rests. For instance, when there is smoke on a mountain, the smoke is the property; the mountain, the property-possessor.

The statements comprising Indian syllogism have the fundamental form: there is a property in a property-possessor. The statement "There is fire on the mountain" has that form, for instance. Of course, other forms are also used, but in Sanskrit they can be smoothly transformed into the form: There is a property in a property-possessor. For example, the meaning of "Sound is impermanent" is expressed by "*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*." ('*Anityaḥ*' is nom. sg., meaning 'impermanent', *śabdaḥ*' is also nom. sg., meaning sound. Usually a copula is not written in Sanskrit.) This Sanskrit sentence can be rewritten as "*śabdasya anityatvam*." (The suffix '-*tva*' is attached to the stem '*anitya*' while '*śabdaḥ*' is replaced by its genitive '*śabdasya*'. The suffix '-*tva*' has the function of making an ab-